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SUSAN BALLARD
It’s a Small World After All
This essay explores the movements of cinema as it is refashioned within an art gallery space. 
In addition it charts a number of research ideas as they find themselves manifest alongside 
Australian artist Susan Norrie’s digital video installation ‘ENOLA’ (2004). The essay engages 
with a current argument in new media theory surrounding the influence and relevance of 
the cinematic apparatus for analysis of new media, and suggests that although both cinema 
and new media can be understood through shared aspects of movement, duration, and 
sound, to reference cinema directly in a digital gallery installation also introduces a number 
of problematic issues surrounding representation and reality. These issues are discussed in 
relation to my firsthand experience of the work as relayed below.
As I walk up the stairs of the MCA in Sydney I am seduced by Muzak drifting from a small room 
screening Susan Norrie’s ‘ENOLA’.1 Following the sound to its source involves navigating a 
number of labyrinthine blind corners, after which I find four rows of wooden stools (arranged 
more like a temporary classroom than a cinema) set before a transparent back-lit screen 
low on an inside wall.2 Viewers who have adopted a stool are obviously lulled into the work’s 
rhythm; I join them, but make sure I have a direct route back toward the door, should I need 
to escape. The screen captures a camera’s drift over a miniature world.3 On screen are two 
tour guides dressed in futuristic charcoal hoodies. They loom over the environment, hiding 
the glare of the sun as they seek out and identify important sights for us. Mimicking the 
camera movement, they rotate like automatons in a shop window. Everything moves at the 
speed of a suffocating slow pan. Equidistant cars dance down a road, enacting a journey to 
work taken by millions each day. Movement is everywhere; in the sound, in the camera, in 
the accomplices, but as viewers we are not allowed the freedom of movement – we squat on 
the stools or stand leaning against the back walls of the gallery, the scale is not ours. This is 
not a cinema where we can forget ourselves inside its projections. 
‘ENOLA’ by the fact of its title makes reference to the bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 
1945 by the B-29 “Superfortress” bomber nicknamed the Enola Gay. Norrie’s earlier works, 
for example, Undertow, 2003, (AGNSW, Sydney) and Notes from the Underground, 2003 
(MCA, Sydney) have dealt with uranium contamination and the impact of atomic research, 
including the atom bomb, on the world. In ‘ENOLA’ there is the sense that the artist is dealing 
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now with the aftermath of such an event. The glare of the bleaching light, the slowed motion 
and the absence of the usual bustle of a city, recalls other filmic representations of nuclear 
disaster aftermath, most particularly, Jimmy T. Murakami’s animation of Raymond Briggs’s 
When the Wind Blows, 1986; and less specifically, however still engaging, the quiet moment 
of aftermath within a dystopic framework in New Zealander Geoff Murphy’s The Quiet Earth, 
1985. As a title, ‘ENOLA’ is used by Norrie as an evocative or associative term rather than 
a specific description. The viewer is made aware of the constructions and manipulations of 
time in a post-nuclear era. ‘ENOLA’ serves to incorporate a significant historical awareness 
as part of a construction of the future that is played out in a theme park that purports to 
exist in an eternal present.
Norrie has slowed time and movement down, and because of this, the perceptual field of 
the DV (digital video) has increased. We have time to see more than a still frame, but not 
enough time to catch the ‘real’ story. The theme park condenses continents into monuments 
as spatial boundaries and geographic borders are collapsed and rendered meaningless. The 
miniature cities before us move in slow motion, they are both uninhabited and full of people 
travelling, walking the streets, sitting in their cars, and leaving on aeroplanes (the constant 
sideways movement is like a merry-go-round) and we scan the expressionless faces before us 
in the hope of seeing someone we know.4 Wonder is replaced with bewilderment as New York 
City’s twin towers pass below us. Because it is marked by these perceptions of time ‘ENOLA’ 
introduces instability to the world displayed. In ‘ENOLA’ materiality as a connection to the 
actual is experienced repeatedly at a remove. That is, these appear to be familiar cities, but 
their locations have shifted, they have shrunk, been packed up close together, their spaces 
invade and overlap. The city has become merely a setting for a ubiquitous monument. As 
viewers we are implicated in the evocation of calm, repetitious, miniaturised movements. The 
world here should be clean and familiar, but Norrie’s hovering camera and the ominous but 
disengaged presence of our guides/ guardians suggest otherwise. The sound track Muzak is 
the final erasure of any evidence of external time and in its place we are left with a reality effect. 
Things are not how they are supposed to be, nevertheless lulled into complicity by the Muzak 
we go along for the ride. (Muzak is music rendered silent, compressed so as to not shock, or 
incite awareness of its presence; Muzak is not even the illusion of sound, but filler.)
‘ENOLA’ suggests that although digital installations owe part of their history to cinema, they 
are not simply cinematic images that behave according to certain principles of imitation and 
simulation. Instead the installation offers what Paul Virilio describes as the “relative fusion/
confusion of the factual (or operational, if you prefer) and the virtual.”5 The spaces of the 
representation do not quite line up with our expectations, so there is a disjunction between 
representation and perception. Traditional cinema has always made use of this reality effect, 
encouraging its viewers to immerse themselves inside an apparatus by which they can 
experience the real up there on a flat screen.6 Virilio sees it as crucial that we understand 
that “the ascendancy of the ‘reality effect’”7 is to do with perception. We want to believe that 
the cinema and anything related to it is real, and tells us something true. The reality effect is 
something we not only let happen but we encourage and play along with its deception within 
the installation machine. Obviously the images of cities, people, cars and mountains within 
Norrie’s installation are not real, but (like Muzak) they are close enough to be suspicious. The 
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digital image presented by ‘ENOLA’ is a machine of “sightless vision.”8 The DV contains images 
which might not have been seen before, and it is unclear whether they align with material 
reality. The viewer enters a space where the screened real is questionable and presented at a 
remove. It is not clear where the line between reality, imitation and simulation can be drawn. 
The installation then documents a shift from reality caught and displayed upon a supported 
surface (an external material reference space) towards a reality which “now emerges in relation 
to time, to the exposure time that allows or edits seeing.”9 Instead of encouraging a cinematic 
suspension of disbelief, ‘ENOLA’ appears to contain disbelief itself; a consistent real which is 
a reality already inverted and made in the time of our viewing/ perception, apprehension.
So where did the idea of the real come from? Ina Blom says that the notion of the real in art 
of the second half of the 20 th century is “anchored in different types of interpretations of the 
relation between image and reality.”’10 That is, the real is the result of:
an exploration of the continuity between artistic process and process ‘in the 
real world’ [that] was generated by an awareness of the mediated nature of 
reality itself, i.e. an awareness of a real that is not simply given, but continually 
produced through signifying processes for which (certain types of) artistic 
creation could even seem to provide powerful conceptual models.11 
Yet we know that although it contained highly plausible reality effects, (hence the apocryphal 
tale of the first viewers of the Lumière brothers’ film L’Arrivée d’un train à la Ciotat, 1895, 
ducking and fleeing the theatre screaming) film was never real in the first place. And, although 
‘ENOLA’ plays with cinema’s tropes, it is obvious for a number of reasons that this is not cinema. 
In particular, Norrie questions the reality effect of cinema as it passes into digital moving 
image. Already existing at one remove (the images it presents are of a simulated scale model 
real), ‘ENOLA’ does not assume a given real, but proceeds by layering illusion with assumed 
reality, with apparent or perceptual reality. In ‘ENOLA’ neither the light nor the architecture 
are literally cinematic. This shifts the apparatus of cinema profoundly, as cinema has always 
been dependant on viewer immobility and darkness for its representational believability. 
The spaces of ‘ENOLA’ are not darkened, nor is the viewer immobilised. Instead, cinema is 
folded into the reality effect of digital installation. Referencing Marshall McLuhan’s equations 
of electricity and light, Timothy Murray has commented that in digital works “viewers are 
beckoned to denaturalize the architectonics of cinema as a means of thinking space within 
the various folds of the subdivision of electric light.”12 In ‘ENOLA’ the projection apparatus is 
hidden and silenced within the smooth surfaces of a digital back projection screen. Murray 
suggests that we think of a new type of digital apparatus which generates a different sort of 
viewer and thus a different sort of reality effect. Without an external authority, the miniature 
real of ‘ENOLA’ is re-rendered miniature DV. For the viewer, the journey is essentially easy to 
take, and lasting just twelve minutes becomes visual Muzak, comfortable enough to watch 
over and over ad nauseam. Any vestiges of external reality or cinematic architecture get lost 
in the slow seduction of a travelogue of an impossible world, accompanied by the uncanny 
remembrance of some catastrophic event.
In its Platonic formulation, representation is understood as a recognisable likeness of 
something real (but does not take the place of the thing itself, which in its insistent materiality 
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is anyway only standing in for an ideal). There is a fundamental triangulation between an 
image; the thing out there that it reflects; and the viewer. From this assertion has grown 
an unspoken but agreed dictum that an artwork cannot be accorded the status of being 
representational until both the viewer and the represented ‘real’ can be isolated from and 
situated as external to the work. This reflective model still holds a place in histories of visual 
culture, (particularly in discussions of photography where it becomes intimately tied to notions 
of truth). Additionally, as soon as the representational artwork could be shifted from location 
to location, it entered an economy of exchange.13 The critique of this model of representation 
is similarly well trod soil in art and cultural theory: Walter Benjamin’s loss of aura and rise 
of the mimetic; Roland Barthes’ eternally present referent, and Jean Baudrillard’s phases of 
simulation map one particular lineage.14 As Lev Manovich comments: “the representational 
machine keeps hiding and revealing itself.”15 Revisiting this concept of representation means 
an inevitable turn towards the viewer’s reality. For Barthes,
representation is not defined directly by imitation: even if one gets rid of notions 
of the ‘real’ of the ‘vraisemblable’, of the ‘copy’ there will still be representation 
for so long as a subject (author, reader, spectator or voyeur) casts his gaze 
towards a horizon on which he cuts out the base of a triangle, his eye (or his 
mind) forming the apex.16 
Representation and reality are connected by a geometrical shaping of the gaze. Barthes 
seems to suggest that not only if I look, but because I look, what I see will be a representation. 
To move away from this is death: “a fetishist subject is required to cut out the tableau.”17 
Representation as isolated exchange between image and viewer simultaneously developed 
into the flat planes of modernist painting, and the darkened architectures of the movie theatre. 
Cinematic representation, however, broke the representational covenant and presented itself 
as real by suggesting that the external referent is a knowledge shared with the viewer of the 
possible real (just past) rather than the actual present. Cinema suggests to a viewer that given 
‘this’ set of circumstances, it is possible that ‘this’ really happened. Cinematic theory has 
spent many words analysing this reality effect –  the sense that we are up there with the hero 
playing along, in a kind of condensed but hyperreal time, or that as women we desperately 
desire their attention, identifying with the rescued princess, rather than the handsome prince. 
As digital installation, ‘ENOLA’ references these histories but does something else with them, 
for it doubles the external referent and instead of pointing us out towards it, loops us back 
into a miniature contrived space, which reflects the possible without the actual. Offering a 
potentially inhabitable space, (in the way that Alice’s slipping into a rabbit hole is both possible 
and impossible) the architectures of ‘ENOLA’ are simultaneously possible and virtual. 
But how did it get here? Digital media has been simultaneously derided and celebrated for 
the role it plays in hyperreal simulation. Darren Tofts comments that in this digital age we 
cannot know that what we see will be real, because “apparent reality endures well… with 
the ambiguous presence of the hyperreal all around us, the best you can hope for is that it 
might be real.”18 The might-be-real does not necessarily have a connection with a reality out 
there, but instead with how we as viewers represent what we see. Both positions situate the 
viewer as the maker of the gaze, the generator of the representation. The representation is 
not pre-existent, and here it shares something with digital code. From within the discourses 
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of programming, Lev Manovich asserts that “the reality effect produced by the representation 
can itself be related to a set of numbers.”19 (Reducing the representation back to code) 
Manovich’s approach to representation is apparent in an early discussion on virtual worlds in 
which he comments that “electronic art from its very beginning was based on a new principle: 
modification of an already existing signal.”20 Electronic art in this model is parasitic on this 
‘already existing signal’. Selection, modification, transcoding, and alteration replace the 
process of creation. It is a framework where everything digital is always already quantified. 
Manovich suggests that the digital image reached this point by developing out of two pre-
existent representational strands. The first traces a language of representation (that is, 
presentation of the real – points to the real, there) from renaissance painting to cinema. The 
second traces simulation (that is, imitation of the real – appearing to be real, here) from mosaic 
to fresco.  The first is framed, isolated, referring always outside of itself, reality is found over 
there. The second adheres more closely to architectures, encompasses spaces, and suggests 
that there is no need to look outside of the image, reality can be found here. Both lead to a 
digital numerical representation which generates installations, like ‘ENOLA’, which are both 
here and there, actual and virtual, dependant on a digital reality effect. 
Manovich comments that “new media objects are cultural objects” and as such they can be 
said to “represent, as well as help construct some outside referent.”21 New media objects 
exist physically for Manovich and are connected to both historical information and a system of 
categories – but are biased. Representation, Manovich argues, is always used in opposition 
to other terms, and he outlines three: representation simulation; representation action; and 
representation communication. In his analysis, Manovich does not break down representation 
itself, but its relationships.22 The viewer’s experience might be of exchange and interaction 
between the representational worlds but they are still separated by a frame. This is due largely 
to Manovich’s reliance on the histories and models of cinema for his definitions. Throughout 
his argument, Manovich retains a sense of the screen as “a rectangular surface that frames a 
virtual world and that exists within the physical world of a viewer without completely blocking 
her visual field.”23  Despite this limitation placed on the relationship between new media 
works and the screen, Manovich suggests that representation is simply an organising and 
privileging of certain sorts of data over others. Where this organisation occurs has always 
been contentious in discussions of cinema.24
Arguing that prior to new media, visual imagery was sampled and then presented to a 
viewer in a linear order; Manovich claims that new media “abandons this ‘human-centred’ 
representation.”25 These representations begin a process which appears traditionally 
cinematic, whereby “time is mapped onto two-dimensional space, where it can be managed, 
analysed and manipulated more easily.”26 Because of its malleability, the possibility is 
presented that new media works might divorce themselves from a reality out there and 
“act [only] as representations.”27 The point for Manovich is that once the new media work 
enters the digital it looses a direct connection to reality and becomes instead numerical 
representation. It is possible to develop Manovich’s point to argue that because everything 
digital is coded, in digital installation time itself becomes another analogy of information, and 
thus is opened up to noise. The work might ‘appear’ to be cinema but is only a metonym for 
it. The suggestion here is that representation generated through the digital just wants to be 
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free. If this is the case, where might this leave the relationship between the object understood 
as representational and the object understood as material? What can be the reality effect 
of a new media object? 
How do we solve this paradox of digital representation? Reading the new media object as 
representational looks at what it does; reading it as material appears to look at what it is. 
Manovich’s position seems to conflate the two, arguing that it is because of its fragmentation 
and numerical coding at the material level that the digital image has shifted our usual approach 
to, and expectations of, representation. Mark Hansen takes issue with this and argues that 
“if the digital image is an accumulation of such discontinuous fragments…there is no longer 
anything materially linking the content of the image with its frame.”28 It is still representational 
content, but fragmented, free to move outside the confines of a frame, and it does this by 
mutating its very surfaces and interlacing these with a viewer; so much so that a reality 
effect is no longer tied to an external reality, but to the processes of viewing. It is “action and 
representation at the same time”.29 Manovich does not seem to want to take the discussion this 
far, suggesting two representational tools which allow the user to intervene in the production 
of the real: the image-instrument and the image-interface. In both, the viewer becomes the 
user; nevertheless both retain a sense of the cinematic screen. As Hansen says, 
it is not simply that the image provides a tool for the user to control the 
‘infoscape’ of contemporary material culture, as Manovich suggests, but 
rather that the ‘image’ has itself become a process, and as such, has become 
irreducibly bound up with the activity of the body.30 
Hansen sees his image giving ‘form’ to information, and it “must be extended to encompass 
the entire process by which information is made perceivable through embodied experience.”31 
Hansen’s take is that new media is “new” because of its displacement of framing functions 
back onto the body.32 On the other hand, new media will always be cinematic for Manovich. 
For him, (even though the details of these frames have changed dramatically) new media 
frames and screens the image. However, the process of getting there is different to the pre-
digital. Hansen says that new media makes the body different. This argument between them 
involves the location of representation versus the location of perception.
If the body enframes the new media representation whether by way of an interface machine, 
or the body as frame itself, then the body’s insistent material presence gives further evidence 
that digital installation does actually shift the languages and parameters of cinema. For “when 
the cinema auditorium is suddenly plunged into artificial darkness, its configuration, the 
bodies in it, dissolve.”33 The dissolving of the audience’s body is not a process of abandoning 
the body, but due to the paradox of representation – as encompassed by cinema’s attempts 
to represent reality (life)– the body as image returns back to the body in the theatre. Or as 
Jean-Louis Baudry puts it, cinema reproduces the scene of the “impression of reality.”34 Flung 
away from the body, Deleuze argues, cinema’s shifts in sequence and cuts and splices in time 
actually end up altering the location of perception, away from the immobilised viewer and into 
a movement space of “gaseous perception.”35 As Clare Colebrook explains, the implication 
is that “film itself, the material of film – its yellowness – is not something we see through to 
grasp reality; we see ‘seeing’.”36 
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In ‘ENOLA’ this shifted perception is multiplied many times over. We see the camera as it sees; 
we see the visitors to the theme park looking at the world below them as they step carefully 
between its buildings; we watch the tour guides watching that scene; we see the spaces of the 
installation; we see the stools which watch the screen mutely; and we see ourselves amidst 
others watching the screen. At no point do any of these levels of vision refer back to a ‘reality’, 
but instead, they keep us aware of the multiple and material structures of the architectures 
of the installation. However, this multiplication and fragmentation of the cinema is not only 
visual. As a sound track, Muzak cannot adhere to the surfaces of the screen; it does not add 
to a narrative, or drive the visual loop, but infiltrates and seeps out of the spaces of the room. 
The Muzak ties our viewing bodies into the architectures of the installation, and lingers with 
us long after we leave. It is through this endlessly repetitive sound track that ‘ENOLA’ makes 
a final slip from the grasp of cinema possible.
As simultaneous event and representation the moving time image of cinema is a material 
force: it is and does. If we follow Deleuze (instead of being simply the result of a play of 
reality effects), cinema is materially constructed from cuts and splices as well as layers of 
time and intensity and encompasses a viewing body in forces of vibration and resonance.37 
Despite Hansen’s insistence, Deleuze never disembodied the viewer, but instead expanded 
the parameters of materiality to include the material of the cinema as well as the body, not 
privileging one or the other. Both become literally and materially tied together in the rhythms 
of “any-space-whatever.”38 Paul Miller (aka DJ Spooky) expands this re-embodiment of the 
material event of the cut and splice when he suggests that: 
Whenever you look at an image or listen to a sound, there’s a ruthless logic of 
selection that you have to go through to simply create a sense of order. The 
end product of this palimpsest of perception is a composite of all the thoughts 
and actions you sift through over the last several micro-seconds – a sound bite 
reflection of a process that updates Frankenstein’s monster, but this time the 
imaginary creature is made of the interplay fragments of time, code, and (all 
puns intended) memory  and flesh.39
The cut and the splice of cinema as discussed here are not solely narrative devices, but 
occur across the whole architecture of the cinema. When that architecture is folded into the 
digital and then further shifted into the spaces of installation, the fragmentation becomes a 
more profound force. New media reality effects do not dissolve the viewing body, nor do they 
insist on an essential embodiment which is presented as a framed reality from out there, (like 
Manovich’s image-instrument, or Hansen’s body-as-frame). Instead, they suggest a process 
whereby the virtuality of representation is somehow still vested in the material and actual. 
‘ENOLA’ is both a noisy and silent digital installation. The apparent disinterest of the camera 
as manifested by its continual spinning movement renders no one thing more important than 
any other; the visual spaces are silenced. The constant noise of the Muzak, however, offers 
little support. There is no point at which we can fix perspective (either visual or aural); and 
our disorientation becomes complicated further by our searching for stability or reality within 
the frames. There is no predetermined cut; no point at which to make an informed narrative 
selection; and no transmission of an external framed reality. ‘ENOLA’ proceeds by way of sound 
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bites, not reality effects. A sound bite contains an ambiguity of matter. It is a resource without 
a necessary source in reality. The digital sound bite is a way of undermining the structural 
reality effect of cinema; whilst retaining a concern with the combination of materialities that 
cinema engenders. ‘ENOLA’ moves cinema aside, by first leaving the light on, and secondly 
by embedding just enough fragments of Muzak in our bodies so that the work never lets us 
leave; so that the narrative never ends ... It’s a small world after all.
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children. The next time the stools were in very neat rows, raising uncertainty whether their role was 
installation object or seat. The original video footage was filmed at Tobu World Square, a theme park 
out of Nikko, Japan. Norrie chose to focus in the film only on America and Europe, although 132 
countries and 14,000 human figures are presented at 1/25 scale models (the humans are 7cm 
tall). The theme park is set on three acres. As Norrie said: “there was the world on display, a theme 
park in an isolationist country…The spaces of the theme park are not contaminated, nothing can go 
wrong.” (Susan Norrie “Artists talk”, Biennale of Sydney, June 2004.)
 4 At one point in ‘ENOLA’ we see full size people walking around in the background; they have the impact 
of the sudden appearance of giants in a fairy story. They do not appear real. A friend commented that 
they observed viewers of the work walk out as soon as the New York Twin Towers arrived. It became a 
deciding point in the loop. Was the work suddenly rendered unreal (through a confusion of materials) 
when what we know has been destroyed is suddenly ‘present’ before us?
 5 Paul Virilio, The Vision Machine, translated by Julie Rose (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press and The British Film Institute, 1994), 60.
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of its passing, as in the taking of a photograph. But at the same time it isn’t there at all. Its photo-
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